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THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECLARATION
OF PARIS.
The YALE LAW JOURNAL for February contains an interesting
article by Professor Theodore S. Woolsey, with the above title.
The article commences with the observation that-I "There is a
probability that the accession of the United States to the Declara-
tion of Paris" (of 1856) "is shortly to be urged upon the Secre-
tary of State." This Declaration, as is well known, begins with
the proposition - " Privateering is and remains abolished;" and it is
with special reference to the renunciation by our government of
the right of privateering that its accession to the Declaration is
urged by the writer. He concludes that if such accession "is a
proper step, it should be taken now."
The step may be quite proper in the sense of being expedient,
but still not really proper because the law does not sanction it.
Conceding all the objections to privateering, there must yet
always be a serious legal obstacle to our joining in an international
agreement that "privateering is and remains abolished." This
obstacle is presented by our very organic law itself, the Constitu-
tion. That instrument, in Article I., Section 8, expressly author-
izes privateering, and contemplates a resort to it, without limita-
tion as to time or occasion (except inferentially that the occasion
shall be war), by empowering Congress, in general terms, "to
grant letters of mar~ue and reprisaL" The power given is a part of
the War Power of Congress; the entire provision being- "The
Congress shall have Power * * to declare War, grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water." Of course no legislative nor executive act can
avail to do away with or modify a constitutional provision, or
divest or impair a constitutional power. Nor can treaty, which
possesses no higher legal force than statute,1 have any such effect.
As the Supreme Court observes in an adjudged case:2 "It need
hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution, or be
held valid if it be in violation of that instrument." (Indeed the
stipulation, which has appeared in some of our treaties, by which
I Sec. 13 Opins. of Attys. Gen. 354.
2 The Cherokee Tobacco, ii Wallace 620.
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the United States agrees, mutually with the other party, to sur-
render the right of privateering, is, in my judgment, clearly an
assumption of authority in contravention of the Constitution).
Thus, should the United States, in the future, be induced in
any form to accede to the Declaration of Paris, or other public
predication by which privateering is in terms renounced or "abol-
ished," the power to commission privateers, as vested by the Con-
stitution, would remain intact. No subsequent Congress could be
bound by such an enunciation. At any later date, when political
conditions were wholly changed-when a war had been initiated
or was impending-Congress could freely, as it did in our earlier
wars, exercise the power, and that it would exercise it is not at
all improbable. Even in our late civil war, when hostilities at
sea were scarcely anticipated, Congress, by an Act of March 3,
r863, authorized the President "to issue, to private armed vessels
of the United States, commissions or letters of marque and gen-
eral reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper and under the
seal of the United States, and to make all needful rules and regu-
lations for the government and conduct thereof and for the adju-
dication and disposal of the prizes and salvages made by such
vessels." Much more, it would seem, would the power be likely
to be exerted in the presence of a conflict with a state having a
formidable navy.
I concur, indeed, with Professor Woolsey that because of the
modern improvements in naval steamers, especially the introduc-
tion of "fast cruisers with large coal capacity," there must be less
occasion than formerly for a recourse to privateers. I do not
however so readily admit his premise that the United States is
more likely to become involved in war with a state "weaker in
naval resources than itself than with one stronger." Our people
might well consider it cowardly for this great republic to engage
in hostilities with a weak nation, while it would be bold or rash
enough to tackle in war the most powerful if the provocation
appeared to warrant it. But, however this all may be, it is cer-
tainly among the probabilities that, in the face of a contest
impending with any considerable maritime, power, Congress, in
availing itself of the weapons placed in its hands, would be
induced to extend to its enterprising sea-faring citizens the oppor-
tunities of the privateer. Though a service less attractive per-
haps than heretofore, it would still be popular with many, and the
emergency would justify it.
But whether an exercise in the future by Congress of the
power to employ privateering be probable or improbable is really
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immaterial. It is enough that the power subsists capable at any
fit time of being called into execution, and while it subsists with
what reason could the United States proclaim that privateering was
no longer possible, was extinct? Under the circumstances, would
not its part of the manifesto be mere ostentation, vain words?
For a government to make formal announcement of the absolute
abrogation of a specific provision of its public law when that pro-
vision still endures in full virtue as from the beginning, would
involve a bald contradiction and a fraud. So to assume to declare
that a certain legitimate mode or means of warfare "is and remains.
abolished," when it is not abolished in fact, and cannot be abol-
ished without a proceeding beyond the reach and function of the
declarant-without a due and formal constitutional amendment
which has not yet been even attempted-would be as futile as it
would be irrational. Conceding, as before remarked, all the
grounds why privateering should not exist, the fact that a contin-
uing power to make it exist resides in proprio vzgore in the charter,
as one of our original constitutional resources, should certainly be
sufficient to deter our government from promulgating its non-
existence to the world.
Thus, in the absence of an amendment of the Constitution by
which the power under consideration shall be stricken from the
enumeration of its express grants -and such an amendment can
scarcely be anticipated as a possibility-it is believed to be demon-
strated that there can legally be no accession by the United States
to the first article of the Declaration.
It may be observed that the Convention of Paris did not assert
that privateering ought to be abolished, but that it was abolished,
finally and permanently. Should our government, in the future,
join in or initiate a proposition that privateering ought to be abol-
ished, while at the same time taking measures to launch a consti-
tutional amendment divesting the existing power of Congress over
the subject, its action would be consistent and a moral effect
might be produced. But a coincidence so improbable need not
be dwelt upon.
The difficulty in which this subject is involved lies simply in
the "fact that we have a written constitution. A nation with a
written constitution of defined powers and rights must often find
itself hampered in entering into positive declarations of principle
or policy with nations not thus embarrassed, and whose legisla-
ture or executive is practically supreme.
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